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Incomplete contracts in the condition of Russian specificity. Part 3. Impact of the corruption component of the institutional environment
Abstract.The subject of this research is the impact of the corruption component of the institutional environment upon the investment decisions of agents and the size of public gain. Within the framework of incomplete contract, it is demonstrated that consideration of the corruption component leads to one of two cases, one of which could be interpreted as extortion, and the other – as conclusion of a mutually beneficial corrupt deal. Special attention is given to the analysis of the capabilities of the agents for maximization of their personal gains, which are defined by their stimuli towards carrying out investments into the growth of mutual profit. It is demonstrated that in the case of extortion the stimuli of the agents diminish, resulting in the decrease of public gain. The determination is made on the existence of the baseline level of stake of the “corrupt tax”, exceeding which makes it preferable to transfer the right to leftover profit to the bribe extortionist. It is demonstrated that widespread practice of corrupt cooperation can lead to negative deformation of the structure of national economy.
Keywords: Efficiency, Stimuli, Transfer of business, Corrupt deal, Extortion, Corruption, Peculiar investment, Ambiguous property rights, Corruption component, Incomplete contract
Article was received:10-05-2017
This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .