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Knowledge as a genuine substantiated opinion and the Gettier-cases
Abstract.This article examines the definition of knowledge as a genuine substantiated opinion, as well as considers certain quasi-standard definitions of knowledge. The arguments are adduced that in order to solve its issues, epistemology requires the philosophy of language and philosophy of consciousness. Particularly, the author pursues parallel between a “difficult problem” of the philosophy of consciousness and the problem of definition of knowledge. The article suggests the definition of knowledge as a “successful” opinion, namely a genuine substantiated opinion, on the condition that an epistemological “gap” between the substantiation (opinion) and the fact (knowledge) is “pragmatically” closed in the sense of Wittgensteinian problem of rule-following. The second Wittengstein’s philosophy combines with the knowledge first epistemology of Timothy Williamson. Knowledge is accepted as a fundamental epistemic rule (norm) for the opinion. It is stated that the so-called Gettier-cases first and foremost have a conceptual status, underlining that the standard definition of knowledge leaves something out of account. The proposed point of view on knowledge is similar to such of Stephen Hetherington, according to which knowledge is a genuine substantiated opinion, on the condition that any specific circumstance is being understood in epistemological sense.
Keywords: difficult problem, epistemic gap, Gettier-cases, Wittgenstein, knowledge first epistemology , substantiation, knowledge, rule-following problem, fallibilism, faillibilism
Article was received:22-07-2017
This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .