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Differentiation of Goals as the Factor of Accurate Assessment of Economic Sanction Political Efficiency
Shlyundt Nadezhda Yuryevna

PhD in Law

assistant professor, Nevinnomyssk State Humanitarian and Technical Institute

357108, Russia, Stavropol'skii krai, g. Nevinnomyssk, bul. Mira, 19a

nshlundt@yandex.ru
Другие публикации этого автора
 

 
Nefedov Sergei Aleksandrovich

Doctor of Politics

Researcher at Pyatigorsk State University

357532, Russia, Stavropol'skii krai, g. Pyatigorsk, pr. Kalinina, 9

offiziell@yandex.ru

Abstract.

This article examines the effectiveness of economic sanctions that are being applied today by states and their associations to realize a wide range of objectives. The authors, expanding the boundaries of the functional purpose of sanctions, propose the concept of differentiating goals, which, in their opinion, simplifies the assessment of the political effectiveness of this instrument of international influence. The authors distinguish between real and declared objectives of sanctions, substantiate the role of sanctions as a means of solving their own internal political tasks and communication tools within the international system, anticipating their results with a brief overview and characterization of stages in the studies of the effectiveness of sanctions. Solving the tasks, the authors turn to the content analysis of specialized scientific literature on relevant topics, classification method, highlighting historical periods and functional properties of economic sanctions, as well as to study specific situations that support the assumptions. The authors come to the conclusion that with the help of sanctions, states can pursue not only the goal to change the behavior of another state against which they are actually directed, but also other goals, often hidden behind official statements. Such goals may include elimination of domestic political problems and the transfer of signals to other participants of the international system, acting in a particular sanction case by a third party. They emphasize that the sanctions can serve the purposes connected both directly with the sanction and with the actual authorizing state, as well as with the goals concerning the international system as a whole, thereby marking new directions for research in the context of modern political science.

Keywords: domestic politics dimension of sanctions, sanction goals, international system, political efficacy of sanctions, economic sanctions, foreign policy tools, world politics, international influence, international communications, differentiation of sanction goals

DOI:

10.7256/2454-0641.2018.4.27700

Article was received:

16-10-2018


Review date:

17-10-2018


Publish date:

09-01-2019


This article written in Russian. You can find full text of article in Russian here .

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